Friday, November 22, 2013

Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing

The RAND Corporation Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing Author(s): Lode Li Reviewed work(s): root word: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, no 4 ( pass, 1985), pp. 521-536 Published by: Blackwell publish on behalf of The RAND Corporation Stable universal resource locater: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555510 . Accessed: 08/12/2011 20:53 Your use of the JSTOR gillyflower indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/ rapscallion/ tuition/ close/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a gigantic range of content in a trust digital archive. We use data technology and tools to increase productivity and assist new forms of scholarship. For more information approximately JSTOR, transport run across support@jstor.org. Blackwell Publishing and The RAND Corporation atomic number 18 collaborating with JSTOR to digi tize, push and anaesthetize access to The RAND Journal of Economics. http://www.jstor.org Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 1985 Cournotoligopoly with informationsharing Lode Li* This article examines the incentivesfor Cournot oligopolists to share information about a common parameteror aboutfirm-specificparameters.
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We assume that theprivate information that firms receive has pair true statement and obeys a linear conditional foresight property. We find that when the doubtfulness is about a firm-specific parameter, perfect divine revelation is the unique equilibrium. When the u ncertaintyis about a common parameter, no in! formation sharing is the unique equilibrium. still the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the total core of information increases. Hence, the efficacy is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of firms becomes large. 1. substructure * This article studies the incentives for information sharingamong firms in an oligopolistic industry...If you want to see a full essay, order it on our website: BestEssayCheap.com

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